Negotiators now hold four rounds of negotiations. This is encouraging, but also shows that the United States has abandoned the broader “big bargaining” that people would like to see. Although at some point, U.S. officials talked about addressing all of Iran’s vicious activities (including the accumulation of its ballistic missionary and support for regional terrorist organizations) and completely “dismantle” its nuclear program, Iranian negotiators are unlikely to remain on the table if such issues are discussed. Instead, negotiations seem to focus on the same challenge that animates the 2015 Joint Integrated Action Plan: How to ensure that Iran’s abundant activities do not lead to nuclear weapons.
The problem is that Iran’s nuclear program looks different from what it was like a decade ago. At the time, the restrictions imposed on the number of centrifuges in Iran could be deployed and could be abundant to give the United States and its allies confidence that the regime would need at least a year to “explode” and produce enough weapon-grade uranium as bombs. That should ensure sufficient time to achieve a strong reaction.
Since then, the regime has established and installed thousands of more complex centrifuges and has gained valuable experience in running them. U.S. officials say using current fissile material stocks, it can produce enough highly abundant uranium in less than a week. Even starting from scratch, its advanced centrifuge cascade may accomplish this task in less than five months.
The Iranian leader claims that the civilian nuclear program they want does not require such powerful capabilities. Therefore, any new transaction should ensure that all advanced centrifuges are destroyed or destroyed from the country. Even the number of first-generation equipment allowed should be strictly limited, so Iran will not attempt to make up for the quantity of its mass loss.
Given the record of the regime, additional guarantees will be required. Iranian officials must address the lingering issue of the IAEA’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons. In addition to the IAEA, they should be required to undergo invasive monitoring by US or European inspectors to demonstrate compliance with any new protocol and to demonstrate that they have not transferred centrifuges or fissile materials to unannounced sites. In essence, the White House should not re-accept the worst failure of the 2015 Olbipations against Iran. Such a sunset clause would only delay the threat of Iranian bombs. The restrictions on enrichment will have to be indefinitely, or so far they may also become leaders in Iran should recognize that such concessions are in their own interests. If any new agreements (and more importantly, U.S. sanctions relief) are to survive in this administration, they will need to be approved by a bipartisan majority. Even if the agreement aims to tear down Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, narrow its missile arsenal and cut back on support for terrorism, it would be a tough sell. Narrower protocols will require more dense density.
The government should seek diplomatic formulas to alleviate concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. It shouldn’t settle down.
