From Sarr to Ratel, a range of constraints: Indian waters treaties and cooperation costs

While the Indian Water Treaty (IWT) is often hailed as one of the most “successful” international moisture sharing agreements, the disputes around it are conducted more closely and tell a more sober story. India’s experience with IWT has not become a consistent victory, but reflects the history of delays, operational compromises and long-term constraints, often stretching for decades.

Salal Project: The First Major Dispute

The first major project in dispute is the 690 MW Salal Hydlectric project on the Chenab River in Roasi, Jammu and Kashmir. In 1968, India submitted the project design to the Permanent India Commission (PIC) for review in Pakistan, as required by the treaty.
Pakistan has raised several objections on the height of the dam, design and transfer of the canal. Although India considers upgrading the matter to a World Bank neutral expert mechanism, it ultimately acknowledged Pakistan’s demands and is eager to maintain the spirit of the 1972 Shimla Agreement.
In 1978, India agreed to make major design changes, including:

• Reduce the dam height
• Eliminate the operation pool
• Key liquids for sealed sediment management

The Salal project was completed in 1987, but soon encountered deposition problems. Without insufficient extension, the reservoir quickly became an elevated riverbed, with the project’s capacity dropping to nearly 57%, seriously damaging its efficiency and life.

Kishanganga and Ratle Project: Dispute Continues

The 330 MW Kishanga project, launched in 2006, became the first project under the IWT to face arbitration in the Court of Arbitration (COA). Pakistan opposed India’s water transfer from the Neelum River and moved the COA in 2010.
The COA’s 2013 ruling was a different outcome for India: it allows for transfers but stipulates the minimum downstream process in Pakistan.
Pakistan was not satisfied and sought further arbitration in 2016 regarding Kishaga’s design.
Meanwhile, Pakistan raised objections to the 2012 850 MW Ratle project. In 2022, it launched parallel procedures at the World Bank, invoking COA and neutral expert mechanisms. India opposes this dual-track approach and issued a formal notice to Pakistan for the first time on January 25, 2023, requesting amendment of the treaty and then a second notice on August 30, 2024.

As of now, both Kishanganga and Ratle projects are to be decided in front of neutral experts.

Project Turpur: Unresolved Disputes

The second major dispute revolves around the Wolal Barrage/Turpur Navigation Project, which was initiated in 1984 at the mouth of the Wolal Lake on the Yale River.

Pakistan objected, claiming that it constituted a “storage” project prohibited under the IWT. It raised the issue of the picture in 1986 and stopped the construction in 1987.

Despite multiple rounds of bilateral discussions until 2006, the project’s viability eventually eroded. Faced with Pakistan’s ongoing dissent and broader diplomatic issues, India has effectively abandoned the Turpur project, the longest unresolved dispute under the IWT.

Bagrihar Project: Cases withdrawn from the World Bank

About a decade later, the 900 MW Baglihar hydropower project on Chenab followed. India provided mandatory prior notice to Pakistan in 1992, but objections quickly surfaced, especially regarding closed spillways (added to prevent similar sediments sold) and storage capacity.

Tensions escalated after India awarded the construction contract in 1999. Eventually, the matter was brought to the World Bank in 2005, and Raymond Lafitte was appointed as a neutral expert.

Lafitte’s 2007 ruling largely maintained India’s design, including a controversial closed spillway, following the extended lawsuit. The dispute was officially resolved in 2010.