How to evaluate India’s military response in accordance with international law?

Foreign Minister Vikram Misri (center) and Colonel Sofiya Qureshi (left) and Wing Commander Vyomika Singh (right) at a press conference at the National Media Centre in New Delhi, on Operation Sindoor, May 7, 2025. Image source: Hindu

INdia and Pakistan agreed on Saturday (May 10, 2025) to stop “all shooting and military operations” after tensions between the two nuclear-weapon neighbors increased. The announcement comes after Indian armed forces oppose Pakistan’s terrorist infrastructure and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in response to the Pahalgam massacre, which claims to have the lives of 26 civilians.

Although India’s Foreign Minister Vikram Misri described the strike as “measurable and non-propaganda”, Pakistan condemned them as “blatant acts of war” and said it was suspected of civilian casualties. With the suspension of hostilities, how to assess India’s military response in accordance with international law?

Can India invoke the right to self-defense?

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter Charter’s universal ban on force outlined in Article 2 (4) reveals a narrow exception, which prohibits member states from threatening or using force to resist the territorial integrity or political independence of any country. It allows for the use of force only after an armed attack to exercise self-defense. The charter does not define what constitutes an armed attack, but the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Nicaragua vs. Us (1986) interpreted it as “the most serious form of use force”, indicating that not all use force use force reaches this threshold. Although the Foreign Minister’s statement did not explicitly invoke Article 51, his description of the missile was a “response” to the Pahargam terrorist attack, which seemed to be a reliance on this principle.

However, this right is not bound. Article 51 imposes procedural obligations on member States to report “immediately” any self-defense military measures to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The UN Security Council then assumes the power to enforce any litigation required to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” Apparently, on May 8, 2025, the Foreign Secretary introduced this request in 13 of 15 UNU member states regarding the Indian missile strike. Pakistan’s envoy was not invited, and Sierra Leone was still not represented as there were no envoys in New Delhi.

Can right-wing be exercised against non-state actors?

The UN Charter only controls the actions of the state and uses force sponsored by the expansion of state-sponsored use. Non-state entities such as terrorist organizations and insurgents operate outside this legal framework, complicating the Charter’s inherently state-centered design. The growing role of such actors in armed conflict following the 9/11 attacks has prompted some states, most notably the United States, to believe that the right to self-defense under Article 51 extends to military operations against non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS).

However, the ICJ adopted a stricter interpretation. In e.g. Nicaragua and Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda ((2005) believes that armed attacks under Article 51 include acts of non-state actors only when they are “conducted by or on behalf of the State”. Therefore, attributed to the state is a necessary condition for invoking the right to self-defense under international law.

“It is evident from the Foreign Secretary’s statement that India has not contextualised the missile strikes within the international law framework. However, by asserting that ‘Pakistan-trained terrorists’ were responsible for the Pahalgam attack and describing it as part of ‘Pakistan’s long-standing record of cross-border terrorism,’ India seems to have directly attributed the attack to Pakistan,” Prabhash Ranjan, Professor at Jindal Global Law School, told Hindu.

What is the doctrine of “unwilling or unable”?

Emerging doctrines in international law allow the use of force to be defended for use against non-state actors operating from another country’s territory, when the country was considered “willing or unable to” neutralize the threat. The United States has been a major supporter of the doctrine, citing it as a military operation in 2011 that killed Al Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden in Pakistan, while 2014 air strikes on IS in Syria, from which the network orchestrated other terrorist attacks. However, states such as China, Mexico and Russia have condemned such military actions to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the host countries and the United Nations collective security agencies.

However, India’s position on doctrine remains ambiguous. exist UNSC Arria Formula Meeting In February 2021, India confirmed that the right to self-defense extended to attacks by non-state actors, noting that these groups often deprive the host country of sovereignty as a “smoke screen.” It then outlines three conditions for invoking such rights: i. Non-state actors repeatedly carry out armed attacks on the state. ii. The host country is reluctant to address the threat posed by non-state actors. iii. The host country is actively supporting and sponsoring attacks by non-state actors. However, legal scholars have Point out It is not clear whether these conditions must be met cumulatively or can be applied independently. If connected reading, India seems to need state attribution, thus making its support for the doctrine uncertain.

Dr Lanyang pointed out that the Foreign Minister’s remarks about Pakistan’s “unproveable steps” to terrorist infrastructure two weeks after the Pahalgam attack, the country has long been a “terrorist paradise” showing reliance on “unwilling or unable to speak”. “The doctrine does not require the state to be attributed to attacks by non-state actors, thus lowering the threshold for invoking self-defense,” he explained. “However, this principle is controversial and lacks consistent state practices, Opinio Juris It must be crystallized into what is necessary for the rules of customary international law. ”

Is it an indispensable proportion in military response?

Military operations in the exercise of self-defense must comply with the necessary and proportionate principles of customary international law. It is widely believed that host countries are unwilling or unable to neutralize non-state participants engaged in cross-border attacks meet the necessity requirement. but, Leiden’s policy recommendations for counter-terrorism and international law (2010) stressed that the use of force is allowed against the host country’s armed forces or facilities only in “special circumstances” (such as when the state actively supports terrorists). According to proportionality, there are two competing views: narrow interpretations limit the forces necessary to prevent continuous attacks, while broader views allow action to expel and prevent future attacks reasonably expected in this case.

“The military strike since 7 May 2025 is targeted only on terrorist infrastructure and not on Pakistani military assets or civilian reconciliation, and they will meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality,” Dr Ranjan said.

What is in front of you?

If a ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan fails to hold, the UN Security Council can take a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. It can also vote on subsequent resolutions to resolve any further violations, including imposing sanctions or deploying its own peacekeeping or military forces. However, the successful adoption of such resolutions is likely shaped by the geopolitical interests of permanent members of the Council, each of whom holds a veto.