The idea of Pakistan was conceptualized by Gujur, a Muslim from the Gorsi clan of Balachour, belonging to my former MP Sri Anandpur Sahib.
He was a “permanent student” at Cambridge University, and at the age of 36 he wrote a booklet called “Now or Never; Do We Survive or Dead?” He listed the knowledge base of Muslim countries as the intellectual base of northwestern India.
The name Pakistan comes from the first letter from Punjab, Afghanistan (NWFP), Kashmir, Sindh Province, and the last letter from the tan. An i was added later to facilitate pronunciation. The name has nothing to do with the fabulous Gobbledygook that Pakistan means pure land.
In the above leaflet, there is a sentence that must have attracted the attention of some stubborn imperialists, as it provides strategic principles for such an entity.
“The Muslim Federation in northwest India will provide a buffer fortress fortresses against India’s invasion, whether from any quarter to invade India or weapons.”
Initially, there was no recipient of this brain-eating program, but by 1940, one of its early supporters became Sir Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the War of Great Britain.
By October-November of 1940 just after the Battle of Britan ended, Churchill was seriously discussing this idea with his colleagues in the war cabinet for he utterly distrusted the Indian National Congress that had resigned from all the provincial ministries in October-November 1939 to protest the decision of the then Viceroy Victor Alexander John Hope, 2nd Marquees of Linlithgow, to declare war on behalf of India against Germany on September 3 March 1939, no consultations were made with Indian leaders. By then, the Pakistan resolution had been adopted on March 23, 1940.
Churchill was worried about the Soviet invasion of India until July 1941 or Operation Barbarossa, where Nazi fascists and Soviet communists fought on the same side, and a second iteration of the large Central Asian competition was expected to begin soon.
Seven years later, what became Pakistan broadly illustrates the architecture of Rehmat Ali and was accepted by Churchill in his rebirth of World War II years. In 1947, Churchill was the leader of the opposition and he won the acceptance of Jinnah, who was derived from Pakistan called the moth being eaten.
West Pakistan was a strategic project of the victorious Anglo-American alliance, as the Cold War had begun in 1945. The future West Pakistan state should have been a buffer to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence.
Therefore, the allies formed West Pakistan to succeed. Therefore, it obtained abundant irrigated land in Western Punjab and prosperous commercial cities in Lahore and Karachi.
On the contrary, East Pakistan has no strategic value, as the UK has sufficient equity in Myanmar and is therefore established as a failure, and therefore, is mostly a characteristic of pastoral people.
But, over the past seven decades, despite the success of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) , West Pakistan (now Pakistan) has had such a great defeat.
Possible myth: Pakistan is perhaps the only country that has a single country, not a military country. It has nuclear weapons, the first strike doctrine, and its client relationship with China, was a US front-line ally in 1980-89, in the 2001-2021 War on Terror.
However, all of these bombs constitute a cracked and unstable internal structure. The Pakistani army may command the country, but does not command a unified country. The country's existence is supported by military rule, foreign aid and a created sense of religious identity. All of this is inherently fragile in the long run.
Its reliance on semi-national radical clothing, which was once an asset in agency conflict, has now become a serious responsibility. Pakistan’s gambling as a Scraft tool on terrorism is perfect. It has been weakening its civilian institutions, undermining the credibility of its diplomatic narrative and continuing global condemnation.
Cracking under the surface: Pakistan was born out of two states theory, based on the false belief that Hindus and Muslims cannot coexist.
However, more than 70 years later, Pakistan's identity is still narrowly fragile. A country built entirely on religious identity is inherently prone to internal fractures and insecurity of existence.
Does even the Islamic Church unite Pakistan?
Even within its Islamic framework, Pakistan has failed to maintain its own Muslim minority. Shias, Ahmadis, Hazaras, Khojas and others face regular persecution, commonly known as pagans. Sectarian violence is local, especially in Punjab and Pabchestan, where extremist groups such as Sipa-Esahhaba and Rashkar-I Janivis flourished. The state’s incompetence or reluctance to contain such a force reveals a hollow ideological core and undermines its claims to defend Muslim causes, including its asylum role in Kashmir.
Pakistan's excessively eccentric military rule has alienated all ethnic and regional groups. Bal Luzhi Province remains involved in the rebellion, characterized by disappearances and military repression. In Sindh, especially in the city’s Mohajir community, a resentment revelation towards the institutions ruled by Punjabi. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the former federal tribal areas (FATA) continue to suffer from economic neglect and Pakistan’s own radical policies. Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, despite its strategic importance, were still deprived of rights and underdeveloped. Pakistan claims to be a federal state without a federal system. Power is concentrated on a unified structure dominated by military and bureaucracy where political parties play only the peripheral role.
The Durand line drawn by colonial forces is still a flash point, not recognized by any Afghan regime, including the Taliban. The Pashtun community on both sides rejected this artificial divide, and Pakistan's long-term ambition to control Kabul not only failed again, but was bombed.
The rise of the Pashtun Tahafuz movement (PTM), a civil rights platform that challenges military surplus, reflects internal unrest. For India, tracking and amplifying this internal resistance voice could be an effective tool for reshaping strategic narratives.
India's strategic leverage: Pakistan's economy is still in chronic trouble, supported by IMF's bailout, Chinese loans and Gulf remittances. In 2025, it is estimated that it will grow at a meager 2.6%. Its financial structure is dominated by military-run conglomerates such as the Fauji Foundation and the Army Welfare Foundation, while its civilian leadership remains weak, splitting and seeing the military institutions of Rawalpindi. Corruption is deeply rooted, tax compliance is bad, economic outlook is grim, inflation, sunken rupee and exhaustion of foreign reserves. Even a strong black economy cannot mitigate this economic ambiguity. Today, Pakistan is not like a sovereign economy, but a protector who relies on the economy.
Pakistani issue? The prospect of Pakistan's collapse is no longer limited to speculation. Its internal contradictions, ideological rigidity, racial unrest, economic vulnerability and political dysfunction have become so profound that the collapse of the state, while no longer imminent, is no longer unimaginable, but a matter of time. This is the ultimate game that India must focus on by strengthening these contradictions. As long as the Pakistani state exists in its current form, its core behavior will not change.
