The Soviet-Afghan War in 1979 was the turning point, and Pakistan's Multinational Corporate Intelligence (ISI) systematically cultivated the jihadist infrastructure, which evolved into today's complex terrorist networks. This intentional farming created fighter jets with different goals – Kashmir-centered aggression, Afghan control, sectarian violence and ideological warfare. Recent data confirm that Pakistan-funded terrorism is revived in the region. The analysis examines Pakistan's deep-rooted terror ecosystem through OSINT, decrypted records and academic research.
It is said to have horror costumes supported by Pakistan
The key clothing is Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let). Let became the main agent in Pakistan's opposition to India in the 1990s. It operates as Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, a designated terrorist operating in Pakistan despite international sanctions. Its rigid command structure includes Zafar Iqbal, Muhammad Yahya Mujahid and Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, who was one of the masterminds of the 2008 Mumbai attack (he was “arrested” but protected in Pakistan's judicial system).
Let our infrastructure concentrate on its 200-acre headquarters complex, namely Markaz-e-Taiba near Lahore, strategically located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) and urban centers including Lahore, Peshawar and Karachi and urban centers including Lahore, Peshawar and Karachi. Ideologically, clothing adheres to the toxic AHL-E-HADITH doctrine (a conservative who strictly adheres to the Quran) and is specifically directed to India, which spreads through over 300 Madrassas networks across Pakistan. Intelligence confirmed that at least 16 were recorded in Pakistan and in the occupied territories. The operational complexity of the group is proven by attacks such as the 2008 Mumbai attack, where 166 people were killed. The 2006 Mumbai train bombing (209 people died); and was planned by the Indian Mujahides (SIMI) in the 2010 German bakery bombing (17 people killed) in Pune.
Let us maintain a transnational scope, which is determined by 21 countries with recruitment networks, dedicated cells in Bangladesh and Nepal have all facilitated action on India. Its financial structure combines ISI direct funding, estimated to be around US$250,000-500,000 per year; private Gulf donors from Saudi Arabia and the UAE; contributions from Pakistani diaspora through Islamic charity; and operations including commodity trading and real estate.
Then there is Jaish-e-Mohammed (Jem). Jem was founded in 2000 by Masood Azhar during the IC-814 hijacking, and its “release” represents Pakistan's suicide terrorism capability. Azhar travels through professional wings with his brother Abdul Rauf Asghar ( Ascali (Military) Wings for direct action; Davati (Missionary) Recruitment and radicalization of wings; and the intelligence department for reconnaissance.
Jem's infrastructure is based on satellite facilities as the enhanced headquarters of Bahawalpur, Punjab. It also has seven major training camps in the Khyber Pakhtukhwa (KPK) province, four of which are in POK, and recently reestablished the camps in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. The Balakot Training Complex was an Indian air strike, but was subsequently rebuilt, specializing in suicide attack training. Its ideology combines Deobandi fundamentalism (a movement within Sunni Islam) with a doomsday worldview.
Jem's operating history includes the 2001 Indian parliamentary attack and the 2019 Pulwama suicide bomb attack, with 40 security personnel killed. The group has created anniversary (Suicide) launched an attack in Kashmir and showed complex capabilities in the infiltration of vehicle-mounted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and military devices.
JEM's financing includes Al-Rehmat Trust Front Charity, which charges $1-15 million per year; trading companies and commodity businesses; protective rackets in Bahwalpur and surrounding areas; ISI funds are recorded through intermediaries; real estate holdings are worth more than $30 million.
Support players and national support
Some of the less mainstream players in Pakistan’s terrorist network include the Haqqani network, a semi-autonomous ISI extension to the Afghan-Pakistan border. Under Sirajuddin Haqqani, despite a US $10 million bounty, it is now Afghan Interior Minister, the network is both an ISI agent in Afghanistan and a facilitator of anti-Indian operations.
Then there is the Islamic State-Korasan (ISIS-K), which comes from the defector of Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), Pakistan, with operating bases in eastern Afghanistan and in tribal areas of Pakistan. Despite ideological opposition to Pakistan’s goals, evidence suggests that elements within Pakistan’s security agencies allow certain ISIS-K operations by default.
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (Hum) also acts as a dedicated recruitment pipeline for the Pakistani agent group, maintaining a wide network in Pakistan’s religious seminary system, where more than 60% of recruits are introduced to JEM and JEM operations.
Among them, Pakistan's relationship with terrorist organizations goes beyond the allegations, which are recorded through concrete evidence, defector testimony, international intelligence assessment and financial tracking. ISI uses terrorism as a national policy through a three-tier system, conducts strategic direction and funding through professional “S-wing” units; operates support through retired military personnel; and material assistance such as weapons, training infrastructure and intelligence. Despite formally joining the “War on Terror” after the 9/11 tragedy in the United States, Pakistan maintains a calculated policy to distinguish between “good terrorists” (serving Pakistan's interests) and “bad terrorists” (targeting Pakistan's assets). The consequences have been devastating – more than 45,000 people have been killed since 1990 due to terrorism by Pakistani hands.
Pakistan's continued appearance on the Financial Action Working Group (FATF) “Gray List” (2008-2010, 2011-2015, 2018-2022) is an international recognition that its systemic failure cannot dismantle the terrorist financing network. The most annoying evidence comes from Pakistan itself – former President Pervez Musharraf openly admitted to accepting the terrorist operations, while former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif confirmed the state’s support for terrorist organizations. Recently, the current Pakistani Foreign Minister said they have done “dirty work” for Western powers. Bilawal Bhutto recently made a similar statement.
Funding and radicalization
Funding to maintain such infrastructure operates through complex mechanisms designed specifically for reasonable deniality. Religious charities are the main collection points, with more than 40 leading organizations raising $150-200 million each year. Other sources include state funds allocated through classified budgets (estimated to US$10-125 million per year); money laundering operations through Hawala network, with major hubs in Dubai, Karachi and Peshawar; narcotic trafficking in Afghanistan-Pakistan-India corridor generates US$75 million per year; and cryptocurrency, inputs indicate $15 million transferred through crypto channels in 2023.
Although FATF pressure has forced some regulatory changes, Pakistan retains these financial pipelines by simply renaming organizations while maintaining its core network.
In addition to financial infrastructure, Pakistan's terrorist networks rely on complex radical devices. Pakistan has over 30,000 Madrassas, of which 10-15% are directly related to extremist organizations. Other models that encourage terrorism include curriculum in religious schools that often promote violent jihad, especially against India; publications, websites and social media channels spread extremist ideologies; and targeted recruitment of disadvantaged youth from economically disadvantaged areas. This creates a radical pipeline of self-sustaining that constantly complements the terrorist ranks.
The evolution of the network
Pakistan's terror infrastructure shows significant adaptability. It first appeared in the 1990s through direct rebellion in Kashmir. Then by the early 2000s, JEM also became a professional suicide attack suit.
However, after 9/11, the operations of such terrorist organizations became more complex and had greater rational denial. They began to integrate network capabilities and information warfare. The Taliban's power to return to Afghanistan in 2021 has greatly inspired this infrastructure. Training facilities have been reestablished in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Penetration attempts along the control line increased (2023-2024); and enhanced operational coordination between LET, JEM and Taliban affiliated groups.
Thus, Pakistan’s terrorist infrastructure represents a deliberate, state-supported system that has survived for decades through deep institutions within Pakistan’s security agencies that view these agent forces as strategic assets rather than terrorist threats. The Pahalgam attack in April 2025 killed 26 civilians and forensic contacts with agents trained in Pakistan proved the enduring threat.
Such infrastructure poses a direct danger to regional stability, especially to India, which continues to bear the human cost of the Pakistani proxy war. This is not only a bilateral issue, but a global challenge that threatens the international order based on rules. Effective response to this threat requires permanent dismantling of international pressures on Pakistan, not just reshaping or temporary restraints – these terrorist organizations and the state institutions that maintain them.
Brijesh Singh is a senior IPS official and the author of “Cloud Chariot”. The viewpoint is personal.
publishing – May 8, 2025 at 08:30 AM IST
